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Taxation has potentially important implications for corporate behaviour.  However, there have 
been few studies of the impact of taxation on companies in developing countries, and fewer still 
concerned with unquoted companies.  In this paper, we study the impact of tax policy on the 
financial decisions of a sample of unquoted companies in India during the period 1989-99 when 
tax rates were generally reduced as part of a wider programme of financial liberalization.  We 
examine the impact of the tax regime on company financing decisions, within the context of a 
model  of  company  leverage,  controlling  for  non-tax  influences  suggested  by  the  theory  of 
corporate finance.  The analysis is carried out using a balanced panel consisting of the published 
accounts of 97 Indian unquoted companies which reported continuously during 1989-99.  The 
model is estimated using GMM.  Estimates of the impact of the 1990s tax reforms are derived, 
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1.  Introduction 
Judging  from  the  dearth  of  studies  in  the  literature,  tax  policy  would  not  seem  to  have  a 
significant role to play in corporate financial decisions in developing countries.  The emphasis in 
the literature has been on the reduction of tax rates, compliance issues and on fiscal stability, 
with the detailed incentive structure of the tax system regarded of second-order importance, at 
least in the early stages of financial reform (for example, Perotti, Strauch and von Hagen, 1998).  
In theory however, tax policy can have an important impact on corporate financial decisions.  
The literature originates with Modigliani and Miller (1963) who pointed out that if corporations 
can deduct debt interest before arriving at taxable profits, a wedge is driven between the after-
tax costs of equity and of debt, and this creates an exception to their famous irrelevancy theorem 
(Modigliani and Miller, 1958).  Subsequent key  contributions to the corporate tax literature 
include King (1974), Miller (1977), Mayer (1986), and Keen and Schianterelli (1991). 
There  have  been  numerous  empirical  studies  of  the  impact  of  tax  on  corporate  financing 
decisions in the major industrial countries (eg. Mackie-Mason, 1990; Shum, 1996; and Graham; 
1996a, 1996b, 1999).  Graham (2004) reviewed this literature and concluded that, in general, 
taxes do affect corporate financial decisions, but the magnitude of the effect is “not large”.  
Exceptionally, Gordon and Lee (2001) found that (US) corporate tax changes had substantial 
effects  on  leverage,  especially  for  the  largest  and  smallest  companies.    Other  studies  have 
investigated taxation as just one element in a general model of corporate financial decisions.  
Harris and Raviv (1991) and Prasad, Green, and Murinde (2005) have reviewed this literature.  
However, the vast majority of this research is concerned with quoted companies in the industrial 
countries.  There are few, if any, studies of tax policy and company financing in developing 
countries and, to our knowledge, none at all concerned with unquoted companies. 
Quoted and unquoted companies face different financing constraints as between debt and equity 
and among different kinds of debt (Röell, 1996).  Evidence from India (Green, Murinde, and 
Suppakitjarak, 2003) and elsewhere (eg. Italy: Pagano, Panetta and Zingales, 1998) suggests that 
unquoted  companies  finance  their  activities  in  different  ways  from  quoted  companies  and 
respond differently to changes in external constraints.  Unquoted companies face less stringent  
cftx-unq-in4WP.doc    2 
disclosure  and  governance  requirements
1  but  have  fewer  financing  possibilities  than  quoted 
companies.  The first point would suggest that unquoted companies could be more nimble in 
rearranging their accounts following a tax change, implying that their financing decisions would 
be more responsive to tax changes than quoted companies.  However, their more limited range 
of financing options would imply that unquoted companies may have less scope to respond to 
tax changes than quoted companies.  A more  general issue  for developing countries is that 
unquoted companies are typically medium-sized enterprises which could, in principle, form the 
next generation of large employers.  The World Bank (1989) has identified a problem of the 
“missing middle” in developing countries: the seeming inability of small enterprises to grow 
into larger companies.  Financing constraints have been identified as a possible cause of this 
problem (Buckley, 1997).   It is therefore important to identify if economic policy can help 
promote or inhibit enterprise financing and, ultimately therefore, enterprise development. 
In  this  paper,  we  study  the  impact  of  tax  policy  on  the  financial  decisions  of  a  sample  of 
unquoted companies in India over the period 1989-99
2.  India is of interest for several reasons.  
It has maintained a thriving private sector from the earliest phases of industrialization, and has a 
wide range of unquoted companies to utilise for this research.  Post World-War II, India pursued 
economic and financial policies that emphasized state planning but, beginning in the mid-1980s, 
the capital markets were liberalised.  The pace of liberalization quickened in the 1990s with a 
series of policy reforms including a progressive lowering of personal and corporate tax rates and 
simplifications to the tax system, so that by 2000, tax rates were substantially below those in 
effect a decade earlier
3.  The sheer size and diversity of the Indian company sector are more than 
sufficient reasons for investigating Indian company financing.  In addition, the succession of tax 
changes in the 1990s offers a unique opportunity to evaluate the impact of changes in tax rates 
on unquoted company financing decisions in a developing economy. 
To study the effects of tax policy changes we utilize a balanced panel of 97 unquoted companies 
covering the period 1989-99.  We set up a general model of firms’ financial decisions which 
includes variables which control for non-debt tax shields and the effects of tax changes.  We 
specialize  the  analysis  by  concentrating  on  firms’  leverage  ratios  but  we  investigate  the  
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robustness of the model by considering different measures of leverage.  An important innovation 
is that the model is estimated using Arellano and Bover’s (1995) GMM technique to control for 
the endogeneity of some of the explanatory variables.  We find that GMM provides considerable 
efficiency gains as compared with more traditional panel-data estimators.  Our model shows the 
impact of tax policy on company leverage, and we then simulate the model to estimate the 
overall effects of the 1990s tax changes on aggregate unquoted company debt in India. 
The paper is organized as follows.  In section 2 we summarize the theory of leverage and set out 
the model to be tested.  We discuss the treatment of taxation and tax policy in the context of this 
model.  In section 3 we discuss the company accounts data used in the analysis and set out the 
empirical counterparts of the variables in the model, apart from those related to the tax system.  
In section 4 we set out some basic facts about the Indian tax system and its development in the 
1990s.  We explain how we measure the impact of tax policy in India and set out the relevant 
variables  for this purpose.  Section 5 discusses the estimation and testing procedures.  The 
results  are  contained  in  section  6.    Section  7  contains  some  concluding  remarks.    Some 
additional detail is contained in an appendix. 
2.  Taxation in a model of leverage 
The modern theory of corporate capital structure has four main strands.  First are theories based 
on asymmetric information, such as the Pecking Order approach (Myers and Majluf, 1984); 
second  are  agency  cost  theories  (Jensen  and  Meckling,  1976);  third  are  transactions  costs 
theories (Williamson, 1988); and fourth are tax-based theories (Modigliani and Miller, 1963).  
However, the tax system necessarily interacts with other determinants of financing decisions, 
and this leads to more integrated approaches such as the Tax-cum-Bankruptcy model (Kraus and 
Litzenberger, 1973).  Unfortunately these theories have mostly delivered a host of special cases 
which,  while  adding  to  our  understanding  of  firm  financial  decisions,  often  do  not  lend 
themselves  to  direct  testing  with  a  closed-form  regression  model.    Thus,  a  common  if  not 
entirely  satisfactory  method  of  testing  corporate  capital  structure  theory  is  to  specify  a 
regression model of the form:  







nt h h nt U V X y ε δ γ β + + + = ∑ ∑ ∑ , , ,                         …1 
Here, ynt is a measure of leverage for company n at time t.  The explanatory variables include 
company-  and  time-specific  variables:  Xh,nt  (h  =  1,…,H);  time-invariant  variables  (eg.  the 
industrial classification of the company): Vg,n (g = 1,…,G); and company-invariant variables (eg. 
official rates of tax): Uf,t (f = 1,…,F).  εnt is an error term whose properties we discuss in section 
5.  This is a panel data model with n = 1,…,N indexing companies, and t = 1,…,T indexing time.  
The explanatory variables are not typically derived directly from any optimisation programme, 
but are variables that, according to theory, may be correlated with firm leverage.  Indeed the 
form of (1) that we use is more general than many existing studies, which have employed cross-
section  data  rather  than  panel  data,  and  have  often  ignored  the  implications  of  time-  or 
company-invariant variables (Rajan and Zingales, 1995). 
_____________________________________________________________________________  
Table 1 about here 
_____________________________________________________________________________  
In table 1 we set out the variables used in this study and the signs of their coefficients which we 
expect in a leverage regression.  An illustrative empirical reference is also given.  Different 
theories of capital structure can be used to justify different combinations of these variables and, 
sometimes, different signs.  The sign we show is that found in a majority of empirical studies or 
suggested by several theories.  We give a second sign and a second reference if the literature 
does not exhibit a clear consensus as to the sign.  (See Prasad, Green and Murinde, 2005, for 
further details.)  The variables are divided into 3 groups: non-tax variables suggested by capital 
structure theory, variables specific to India which we discuss in section 3, and tax variables. 
The 8 variables derived from capital structure theory are well-known (Harris and Raviv, 1991).  
However, it is worth observing that many studies of capital structure include relatively few 
explanatory variables.  Recent research has concentrated on the dynamic adjustment process 
(Ozkan, 2001; Guha-Khasnobis and Bhaduri, 2002; Nivorozhkin, 2003; Banerjee, Heshmati and 
Wihlborg, 2004).  We do not include dynamics for three reasons.  First there is little agreement 
on  a  general  theory  of  capital  structure,  and  certainly  no  accepted  theory  of  the  dynamic  
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adjustment process; a dynamic model could be rejected or incorrectly accepted because of a 
combination of mis-specified static and dynamic models.  Second, the standard GMM estimator 
for dynamic models (Arellano and Bond, 1991) involves a loss of information in that time-
invariant effects cannot be identified.  This is a serious problem in corporate finance studies, for 
company-specific effects are known to be important in financing decisions.  Third, we do not 
intend to test a ‘new’ theory of finance but to identify the importance of tax relative to other 
determinants of leverage.  Accordingly a simpler approach appears more appropriate. 
Tax policy concerns tax rates and non-debt tax shields.  The impact of different tax rates was set 
out by King (1974, 1977), who considered bilateral choices among debt, equity or retentions, 
and showed that, under certain assumptions, these depend on the following conditions:  
  If retained earnings are given, and: (1 - i) > (1 - t)(1 - m), debt is preferred to equity; 
  If equity is given, and: (1 - i) > (1 - t)(1 - z), debt is preferred to retained earnings; 
  If debt is given, and: (1 - m) > (1 - z), equity is preferred to retained earnings. 
Here, z = capital gains tax rate, t = corporate profits tax rate, m = marginal tax rate on dividends, 
and i = marginal tax rate on debt interest
4.  These conditions distinguish between equity and 
retentions by assuming that the payoffs to equity are dividends and those to retentions are capital 
gains.  In practise, the true rate of tax on equity is some combination of the two, a point also 
emphasised by Miller (1977).  Non-debt tax shields include tax-deductible cash or non-cash 
expenses (such as depreciation), or profits from specific activities which are given favoured tax 
treatment.  Miller (1977) recognised that the value of a firm’s non-debt tax shields would affect 
its ability to use debt as a tax shelter because it may run out of pre-tax profits to shelter.  This 
argument was later formalized by DeAngelo and Masulis (1980), and Mayer (1986) extended 
the analysis to allow for loss carry-over.  However, Keen and Schiantarelli (1991) showed that 
their  arguments  applied  only  to  bilateral  margins  (eg.  debt-equity  or  debt-retentions).  
Simultaneous equilibrium of debt, equity and retentions typically requires additional conditions 
to be imposed on the problem, such as constraints on investors' ability to engage in tax arbitrage. 
Empirical  researchers  have  differed  in  the  manner  in  which  they  have  sought  to  model  the 
impact of tax policy.  Chowdhury and Miles (1989) used statutory tax rates to calculate King’s  
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conditions, and used these as regressors in a model of British firms’ debt and dividend policies.  
An obvious problem with this procedure is that few statutory rate structures can be summed up 
in a single marginal tax rate.  Moreover, statutory tax rates are true marginal rates only under 
restrictive assumptions, particularly because of the existence of non-debt tax shields.  A firm 
which can newly utilize a deduction or which loses a deduction may face a marginal tax rate 
anywhere  between  zero  and  100%,  and  there  can  be  substantial  inter-firm  variation  in  true 
marginal tax rates (Graham, 1996a).  Finally, in a short panel, there is often little or no time-
variation in tax rates, and obviously none at all in a cross-section. 
Therefore,  a  more  common  practise  is  to  use  estimated  non-debt  tax  shields  directly  as  an 
explanatory variable in a regression model (Titman and Wessels, 1988).  The problem with this 
approach is that while some non-debt tax shields, such as depreciation, can be estimated from 
company accounts, others such as loss carry-overs can only be estimated indirectly, if at all.  
This has led some researchers to use as regressor a firm’s effective tax rate, estimated as the 
ratio of taxes paid to pre-tax earnings (eg. Booth, Aivazian, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 
2001
5).  However, this represents the average rather than the marginal rate of tax, and is the 
outcome of a whole sequence of corporate business decisions.  Moreover, since each one is 
determined partly by the firm, neither non-debt tax shields nor the effective tax rate is a measure 
of tax policy.  Graham (1996a) estimated ‘true’ marginal tax rates for US firms allowing in 
particular  for  the  carry-forward  and  carry-back  of losses.    However,  his procedure  required 
seven years' pre-sample data to calculate each year's marginal tax rates.  Indian data do not have 
an adequate time span for this purpose, and they do not include information about loss carry-
back or carry-forward which is available in the US.  It is therefore not feasible to estimate firm-
specific marginal tax rates for India.  Moreover, any calculated firm-specific marginal tax rates 
will be an unreliable guide to the effects of policy because they are necessarily ex-post, as they 
are functions of realized profits.  Company decisions may have been based on marginal tax rates 
assuming a different level of profits from that which subsequently materialized.  Thus, it is not 
clear that calculated marginal tax rates are more useful than official rates as a measure of the 
marginal tax rates that firms believed they faced when making financial decisions.  Furthermore,  
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work by Graham (1996b) and Plesko (2002) suggests that, leaving aside loss carry-overs, the top 
statutory tax rate is the best proxy for the true marginal rate for most (US) firms
6. 
The upshot of these considerations is that we are unlikely ever to find a unique mapping from 
the whole tax code to the tax actually paid by each individual firm.  Therefore, we would argue 
that statutory tax rates (measured by King's conditions) and variables which measure the effects 
of the tax code (effective tax rates and non-debt tax shields) are all relevant in understanding the 
effects of tax policy.  Furthermore, statutory tax rates provide an unambiguous measure of tax 
policy.  We explain the empirical counterparts of these variables in section 4. 
3.  Data and Variables of the Model 
3.1 Data 
Our sample is based on all private non-financial unquoted Indian companies within the Prowess 
database (Centre for Monitoring the Indian Economy, 1997) that reported balance sheets and 
income  statements  every  year  during  1989-99.    This  excludes  foreign  companies,  financial 
companies, and companies which were majority owned by the central or state governments.  We 
also excluded: firms whose accounts contained arithmetic errors; firms whose sales or net assets 
were non-positive in any account year; firms which reported negative depreciation or net worth
7; 
firms with any account year of under 7 months; and firms which reported more than one set of 
accounts in the same calendar year
8.  These filters left a balanced panel of 97 companies.  The 
model was estimated over 1990-99, with 1989 data being absorbed by the instrumental variables 
used in estimation.  These data provide a relatively long time-span for such a large sample of 
unquoted companies in a developing economy. 
Data in Prowess are organized in a standardized format following Indian accounting standards.  
Indian companies are not required to produce consolidated accounts and, unlike their OECD 
counterparts, most choose not to consolidate (Price Waterhouse, 1996; Institute of Chartered 
Accountants of India, 2000).  This implies that there may be some double-counting of intra-
group assets and liabilities.  The vast majority of companies have a year-end report date in 
March, at the end of the tax year.  However, as some companies have other report dates, all the  
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macroeconomic data used in the analysis, such as tax rates and prices, were aligned with the 
report date of each company on a quarterly basis
9. 
Business groups are of long-standing existence in India.  These are groups of companies within 
which  effective  control  is  exercised by  the  same  group  of  shareholders,  and  they  generally 
follow the same conglomerate structure as business houses in other Asian countries.  More than 
60% of the companies in our sample are part of a business group
10.  Hirota (1999) found that 
Japanese keiretsu have an important impact on debt policy, with keiretsu firms having 4-5% 
higher  leverage  ceteris  paribus  than  non-keiretsu  firms.    We  follow  Hirota  by  using  shift 
dummies to control for group effects in India. 
_____________________________________________________________________________  
Table 2 about here 
_____________________________________________________________________________  
Table 2 summarises the broad properties of the sample.  In 1994, the median company had sales 
of about $12m and net assets of about $7m, emphasizing that these are mostly not large firms. 
3.2 Empirical variables in the model 
Capital structure theory does not provide an unambiguous empirical concept of leverage.  In 
addition, an important issue, which has been neglected in the empirical literature, is that some 
qualitative  predictions  of  the  theories  of  leverage  depend  in  part  on  the  exact  measure  of 
leverage to be used.  Accordingly, we employed several different measures of company leverage 
(table  3)
11.    These  embody  three  different  concepts  of  debt,  the  widest  of  which  is  total 
liabilities.  This includes conventional accounting items which are not usually thought to reflect 
borrowings to finance a company's assets
12.  A narrower measure is debt + trade credit.  This 
includes all debt due to institutions and the market, and trade credit received.  Trade credit 
received is sometimes netted out against credit given, or excluded altogether from debt, as it can 
be argued that it finances a company's ongoing business rather than its assets per se.  Excluding 
trade credit gives our narrowest measure which we simply call debt.  For the denominator of the 
leverage measure, it is sensible to relate total liabilities to total assets; for completeness we also  
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related the narrower measures of debt to total assets.  However, it is more usual to relate the 
narrower definitions of debt to company capital.  We therefore utilized two other denominators 
for the leverage ratio: debt + equity + retentions and debt + equity.  Equity and retentions 
consist of shareholders' funds and specific reserves.  Equity consists of a firm's equity capital 
and share premium reserves, and corresponds as nearly as possible to the cumulative total of 
funds raised through share issues.  We used these 7 measures of leverage in separate regressions 
and compared the results obtained from each, partly as a test of theory, but also as a check on 
the robustness of the empirical model. 
_____________________________________________________________________________  
Tables 3 and 4 about here 
_____________________________________________________________________________  
The  explanatory  variables  of  the  model  are  listed  in  table  4.    Asset  tangibility  measures  a 
company's capacity to secure its debt, and hence the ability of creditors to secure their assets in 
the event of bankruptcy.  It should be positively related to leverage.  However, a company's non-
fixed assets include liquid assets which provide a cushion against financial distress.  A low fixed 
assets ratio may reflect high liquidity which is usually positively related to leverage, implying a 
negative relation between tangibility and leverage.  Accordingly, Titman and Wessels (1988) 
argue that it is the proportion of a company's assets which are not realisable that is of more 
interest.  Asset intangibility measures a company's inability to secure its debt and hence should 
be negatively related to leverage.  Size is used in the model as a measure either of diversification 
or information.  Large, diversified companies may be less risky or have lower bankruptcy costs 
and thus have higher leverage.  An alternative view is that large companies are less transparent, 
less-easily monitored, and so will have lower leverage.  Gordon and Lee (2001) find evidence 
that the size of company has a significant effect on its response to tax changes.  Size may be 
measured either as (log) real net sales or real net assets.  We prefer to use sales as they are less 
prone to contamination by idiosyncratic asset structures or reporting procedures. 
Growth opportunities are measured by the product of the retention rate and the return on equity, 
following  Klein  and  Belt  (1992)
13.    Firms  with  more  rapid  growth  prospects  may  pass  up  
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profitable investment opportunities if they are highly leveraged and will therefore prefer lower 
leverage ratios.  Trade-off theories of leverage would suggest a positive relationship between 
profitability  and  leverage,  as  more  profitable  companies  can  gain  easier  access  to  the  debt 
market.  Recent empirical evidence is more favourable to pecking order theories which predict a 
negative relationship: more profitable companies signal their profitability by relying on internal 
financing rather than debt (Myers and Majluf, 1984).  However, since the pecking order consists 
of retentions first, followed by debt, and then equity, even if profitability is negatively related to 
debt/(debt+equity+retentions), it is more likely to be positively related to debt/(debt+equity).  As 
our data distinguishes between these measures of leverage, we can examine this issue precisely. 
Risk-return considerations suggest that business risk will be negatively related to leverage, and 
this is the consensus of the evidence.  In theory however, risky firms have a higher option value 
than do safer firms: their probability of financial distress is higher, but so is their probability of 
escape from distress.  Thus, risk could be positively related to leverage.  Risk is commonly 
measured by the standard deviation of returns  over some past time period, but this method 
throws away potentially valuable time series data.  We proceeded instead by estimating firm-by-
firm regressions of real value-added on time
14.  The absolute residuals from these regressions 
are consistent estimates of the conditional standard deviations of value-added (Engle, 1982), and 
these were scaled by mean value-added to arrive at our measure of business risk (RISK).  A time 
trend  is  a  crude  one-dimensional  model  of  profit,  and  we  enlarged  it  in  a  simple  way  by 
distinguishing between firms with a positive trend and those with a negative trend.  We would 
expect firms with a declining trend in profits to encounter financial distress at some point.  For 
such firms, the positive option value of a volatile business may be more important than the 
conventional negative valuation of the risk.  One would therefore expect the size and possibly 
the sign of the coefficient of RISK in a leverage regression to depend on whether the risk was 
measured about a rising or declining trend.  Thus we distinguish between: RISKP = RISK for 
companies with an upward trend in value added, and RISKN = RISK for companies with a 
declining trend in value added.   In fact, RISKN was never significant,  and it was therefore 
dropped from the analysis.  
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The age of the firm is a reputational variable: the older the firm, the higher its expected leverage 
ratio, because the better its reputation.  Industry class is associated with the specialization of the 
capital  stock,  which  affects  the  liquidation  value  of  the  company:  the  more  specialized  the 
capital, the less its liquidation value and the lower the firm's leverage ratio (Titman, 1984).  We 
control for the industrial class of a firm using an 11-industry classification.  Differences in 
behaviour between firms which are members of a business group and those which are not are 
modelled  using  three  shift  dummies  corresponding  to  the  classification  in  Prowess:  top  50 
business houses, other large business houses, and 'small' business houses.  A correlation matrix 
of all the company- and time-specific variables in the model is provided in the appendix. 
4.  Modelling the Impact of the Tax System in India
15 
India operates a broadly classical system of corporate tax
16.  Corporate profits are taxed in the 
hands of the company on a mildly progressive scale, and dividends are taxed again in the hands 
of shareholders.  Companies act as tax collectors: they deduct personal income tax at source at a 
statutory rate before payment of dividends and this tax cannot be set against the corporate profits 
tax.  Through May 31
st 1997, dividends were included in shareholders' ordinary income.  Their 
total incomes were subject to a single rate scale, with the dividend tax deducted at source being 
put towards their general income tax obligations.  Effective June 1997, the rate of dividend tax 
was set at a flat 10% which is deducted at source by the paying company.  Shareholders have no 
further obligation to tax, but cannot reclaim excess tax if their total tax obligations are less than 
dividend tax already paid.  Neither dividends nor the 10% withholding tax on dividends can be 
set against the corporate profits tax.  However, dividends paid by a company can be deducted 
from  the  dividends  it  receives,  the  latter being  otherwise  taxed  as part  of  company profits.  
Interest income is included in households' ordinary income and taxed accordingly.  Individual 
income tax is progressive with the degree of progressivity having been reduced considerably 
during  the  1990s  (Shome,  1997).    Available  evidence  suggests  that  the  majority  of  private 
shareholders have incomes in excess of the minimum at which the top rate of tax becomes 
payable (Gupta, 1991)
17.  Company profits tax is also (very mildly) progressive
18.  
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Realised capital gains were taxed as part of income until April 1992.  Since then, the rules have 
distinguished between short-term gains which are taxed as income, and long-term gains which 
are taxed at a uniform rate of 20%
19.  Gains are calculated after indexing the purchase price of 
the asset by an appropriate price index. 
We calculated King's tax conditions (table 5) using the highest applicable statutory tax rates 
faced by debt and equity-holders.  This involves two important simplifications.  First, the tax 
cost of equity is allocated to dividends and that for retentions to capital gains.  Second, some 
stakeholders may be subject to tax at lower rates.  However, since realized profits and tax rates 
may differ from those which are anticipated when financial decisions are made, we would argue 
that the highest statutory rates represent the best rule of thumb for the purposes of the present 
analysis.  Also, this procedure is broadly consistent with the results of Graham (1996b) and 
Plesko (2002).  Moreover, as we explain below, we control directly for the effects of non-debt 
tax shields and variations in the effective tax rate using other variables in the model. 
_____________________________________________________________________________  
Table 5 about here 
_____________________________________________________________________________  
Evidently there have been significant changes in the incentive structure for debt, equity, and 
retentions implied by the tax system.  The introduction of the flat 10% dividend tax in 1997 had 
a particularly  marked  impact  on  the  debt-equity  margin,  although  its  stated purpose  was  to 
encourage retentions and therefore to act mainly on the equity-retentions and debt-retentions 
margins (Dutt and Sundharam, 2000).  We cannot be precise about the predicted signs of King's 
tax  conditions  in  the  regressions,  partly  because  different  leverage  measures  capture  the 
proportions  of  debt,  equity  and  retentions  somewhat  differently,  and  partly  because  of  the 
simplifications already noted.  If dividend tax is associated with equities and capital gains tax 
with retentions, we would expect TXDVR and TXDVE to be positively signed but, in general, 
they could be of either sign, as could TXEVR.  Finally, it should be noted that, although there is 
no cross-sectional variation in King's tax conditions at a point in time, there is cross-sectional  
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variation  in  our  sample  because  of  variations  in  the  duration  and  end-dates  of  company 
accounting years.  (See section 3.1)  This helps to identify the impact of these tax conditions. 
Following, inter alia, Booth et al (2001) we used the effective tax rate to measure the impact on 
firms of the tax system as a whole.  If this is a forward-looking rate used in financial decisions, 
we would expect a positive relationship with leverage.  However, a high effective tax rate could 
reflect high profitability, or past low leverage for reasons unrelated to tax.  Thus the relationship 
to leverage could be negative, as indeed Booth et al (2001) found.  To allow for the possible 
endogeneity of this variable, we instrument it in the estimation procedure. 
India's corporate tax system provides four main non-debt tax shields: operating losses can be 
carried forward up to 8 years, but not carried back; depreciation is allowed, and can be carried 
forward indefinitely; all profits arising from exports, where the foreign exchange is remitted 
back to India, are deductible; and certain research and development (R&D) capital spending is 
deductible.  The estimation of loss carry-forward requires presample data which is not available.  
Furthermore, given the difficulty of arriving at separate estimates of the remaining non-debt tax 
shields
20,  we  followed  Titman  and  Wessels  (1998)  and  used  earnings,  interest  and  taxes  to 
estimate total non-debt tax shields. 
5.  Estimation Procedures 
As explained in section 4, there is some cross-section variation in the King tax ratios.  For 





t n h h t n V X y , , , , , ε γ β + + = ∑ ∑                               …2 
The crucial issues in estimating (2) are: the composition of the error term, the structure of the 
error variances, and the possible endogeneity of the explanatory variables.  The general panel 
data model allows for a two-way error component model implying that εnt has the form: 
nt t n t n λ η µ ε + + = ,                                         …3 
Here, µn ~ IID(0, σµ
2), ηt ~ IID(0, ση
2), and λnt ~ IID(0, σλ
2) are IID random variables with µn 
being  the  unobservable  firm  effect,  ηt  the  time  effect,  and  λnt  the  remaining  disturbance.   
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Diagnostics aimed at clarifying the structure of the error components and other estimation issues 
suggest that there are significant firm effects and heteroskedasticity in the data (table 6), but 
there is no evidence of time effects, and two pooling tests are comfortably accepted.  Hausman 
tests suggest that there may be correlation between individual effects and explanatory variables 
in some cases but not others.  We conclude that we need to allow for company effects and 
heteroskedasticity,  but  not  time  effects.    This  is  consistent  with  results  reported  by  Green 
Murinde and Suppakitjarak (2003) who find that there were only gradual changes in the balance 
sheets of unquoted companies in this period.  These are likely to be explained by movements in 
the explanatory variables of the model rather than by more independent structural changes. 
_____________________________________________________________________________  
Table 6 about here 
_____________________________________________________________________________  
We turn next to endogeneity.  Estimation of panel data models with a lagged adjustment term is 
usually done using the Arellano and Bond (1991) procedure.  However, we would argue that 
endogeneity is not confined to models in which there is lagged adjustment.  Since some of the 
Xh in (2) are scaled by total assets, they are necessarily endogenous in models seeking to explain 
the ratio of debt or liabilities to total assets (GDAi).  In general, one would expect many of the 
entries in a firm’s balance sheet at a point in time to be determined simultaneously, and since 
balance sheet entries appear on both the left-hand side and the right-hand side of (2), at least 
some of the Xh are necessarily endogenous in any version of (2).  In addition, the effective tax 
rate is evidently not independent of any measure of leverage.  Under these circumstances, the 
results  of  the  Hausman  tests  are  not  surprising.    However,  endogeneity  in  this  sense  is 
commonly ignored in empirical studies of capital structure.  Rajan and Zingales (1995 arbitrarily 
lag all their explanatory variables one period; other recent studies ignore the issue entirely and 
treat all the Xh as exogenous (Wiwatanakantang, 1999; Booth et al, 2001).  In this paper we 
argue that properly allowing for the endogeneity of the Xh has an important impact on the size 
and more particularly the significance of the estimated coefficients. 
To clarify these issues, it is convenient to rewrite (2) in matrix notation as:  
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ε θ + =W y                                           …4 
Here, y' = (y11,...,yN1,... ...,y1T,...,yNT); and W is a NT×(G+H) matrix of explanatory variables.  W 
is partitioned as W = (X, iT⊗V): X are firm- and time-varying explanatory variables; V are time-
invariant variables; and iT is a T-vector of ones.  We define X = (X1, X2); and V = (V1, V2), such 
that (X1, V1) are “exogenous” and (X2, V2) are “endogenous”.  X2t are correlated with λt; but X1t 
are not.  Lagged values of X2 are assumed to be uncorrelated with λt but, since V2 are time-
invariant, they are necessarily correlated with λ.  Thus: E(λ|X1, X2,t-j, V1, µ) = 0; (j > 0).  As there 
are no dynamics, the simplest estimation procedure which allows for endogeneity and individual 
effects is the within-group (one-way) instrumental variable (OWIV) estimator: 
QY Q Z QW Q Z ' ' ) ' ' ( ˆ 1 − = θ                                   …5 
Q = (INT - iTiT'/T⊗IN) is the within-group operator, so that: Qε = [εn,t -εn], withεn = Σεn,t/T, and 
Q'Q = Q.  Z is a matrix of instruments which in our model can include X2,t-j.  However, the 
OWIV  estimator  does  not  allow  for  the  heteroskedasticity  which  we  observe  in  our  data.  
Moreover, there is a loss of information, as the time-invariant effects (γ in (2)) are unidentified. 
It  is  now  recognised  that  a  multivariate  estimation  method  is  the  most  effective  method  of 
dealing with endogeneity and heteroskedasticity (Chamberlain, 1982; Arellano and Bond, 1991).  
However, an important disadvantage of the Arellano-Bond method is that it too leaves the time-
invariant effects (γ) unidentified.  In this paper we follow instead Arellano and Bover (1995) 
whose method enables us to identify all the parameters of interest, including γ.  To implement 
this method, we interpret (4) as T cross-section regressions, each corresponding to a certain year, 












                                          …6 
K is any (T - 1)×T matrix of rank (T - 1) such that KiT = 0.  Arellano and Bover show that θ ˆ is 
invariant to choice of K, and suggest either the first difference operator or the first T - 1 rows of 
the within-group operator.  We use the within-group operator, since it splits the model naturally 
into T - 1 within-group equations and the T'th (between) equation.  We then seek a matrix of 
instruments (Z) such that:  
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These orthogonality conditions imply that the H-transformed version of (4) can be estimated by 
GMM and θ ˆ is given by: 
HY Z Z H H Z Z H W HW Z Z H H Z Z H W ' ) ' ' ( ' ' ] ' ) ' ' ( ' ' [ ˆ 1 1 1 − − − Ω Ω = θ               …8 
where Ω may be estimated from the residuals of a preliminary consistent estimator. 
Instrumental variable estimators face a trade-off between bias and efficiency: more instruments 
increase efficiency but also increase bias.  Ziliak (1997) has shown that this trade-off exists for 
GMM estimators even in large panels
21, and severe bias may occur if too many instruments are 
used.  However, there is little guidance on how to choose a set of instruments in practise.  As the 
within-group operator eliminates µ from the first T - 1 equations in our model, all exogenous 
and predetermined variables (X1, X2,t-j, j>0, V1) are valid instruments in these equations.  The 
within-group  transformations:  QX1  and  QX2,t-j  are  valid  alternatives  to  X1,  X2,t-j.    The  T'th 
equation is more problematic as it has to be instrumented by variables which are uncorrelated 
with ε, and therefore uncorrelated with the firm effect (µ) as well as with the idiosyncratic effect 
(λ).  Defining zT as the instrument vector in the T'th equation, Arellano and Bover (1995) show 
that identification of γ requires that E(µ|X1, V1) = 0, and dim (zT) ≥ dim (γ), otherwise there are 
insufficient instruments for the T'th equation.  However, it is not easy to find time-invariant 
variables (V1) which are uncorrelated with the individual firm effect.  In our model we would 
expect industry and business group membership to be correlated with the individual effect.  We 
can get around this problem by making the weaker assumption that the correlation between X1 
and µ is constant over time, implying that removing the time mean from X1 (by applying the 
within-group transformation) will create a set of valid instruments for the T'th equation, since in 
this case:  ∑ = = − T X X    X X E t / ; 0 ) , | ( 1 1 1 1 η µ . 
Therefore, we used current values of the exogenous variables and 1 lag of the predetermined 
variables as instruments in the first T-1 equations (X1,t-j+1, X2,t-j, j=1), and current and 2 lags of 
the exogenous variables in the Tth equation  (QX1,t-j+1, j=1,...,3).  This was the minimum number 
of feasible instruments needed to obtain well-determined estimates of the parameters associated 
with  the  King  conditions  and  to  identify  the  parameters  associated  with  the  cross-sectional  
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variables.    Our  assumptions  are  more  conservative  than  is  common  in  the  literature:  we 
instrument all variables constructed as ratios to total assets, the effective tax rate, and all the 
time-invariant variables in the model.  The instruments are set out in full in the appendix.   
6.  Empirical Results 
6.1 Parameter estimates 
We  report  parameters  estimated  by  GMM  for  all  7  leverage  measures  and,  for  purposes  of 
comparison, by OWIV for GDA1
22 (tables 7(i) and 7(ii)).  Clearly the GMM estimates are much 
better determined than the OWIV estimates.  Nearly all the key parameters estimated by GMM 
are well-determined and numerically plausible, and the gain from using GMM appears to be 
considerable.  The Sargan tests confirm that the overidentifying restrictions are accepted.  We 
also tested equality restrictions for the coefficients associated with the King conditions, and 
business group and industry dummies but, given how well the coefficients are determined, it is 
not  surprising  that  these  are  all  rejected.    Comparing  the  results  across  different  leverage 
definitions, there are variations in the magnitudes of parameters as we would expect, but in 
general, the signs are remarkably consistent from one definition to another, with few anomalies. 
We turn next to a discussion of individual parameters.  The coefficients on TANG and INTAN 
display some anomalies with about half having the "wrong" sign.  SIZE is uniformly positive, 
suggesting that size is associated with diversification, lower risk and therefore higher leverage.  
Profitability  and  risk  are  all  signed  negative,  consistent  with  the  preponderance  of previous 
empirical evidence.  However, there is no evidence of a sign change for the coefficient on PROF 
as between the GDE and GDER equations.  There is therefore no support for this aspect of 
pecking  order  theory  in  the  data.    The  positive  coefficient  on  growth  is  less  usual  but  is 
consistent with findings from small UK companies (Jordan, Lowe and Taylor, 1998).  AGE is 
mostly positively signed as expected.  The time-invariant variables are generally somewhat less 
significant.    Companies  in  business  groups  generally  have  higher  leverage  than  non-group 
companies  (substantially  so  for  some  definitions),  a  finding  that  is  consistent  with  Hirota’s 
(1999) results for Japan.  Furthermore, the effect is larger the larger is the size cohort of the  
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business group.  The industry dummies vary in size and significance suggesting that industry 
effects are important for some industries but less so for others.  Overall, we would argue that 
these results provide a convincing and robust model of leverage to use as a control to investigate 
the effects of taxation. 
_____________________________________________________________________________  
Tables 7(i) and 7(ii) about here 
_____________________________________________________________________________  
We therefore turn finally to the tax variables.  The coefficients on non-debt tax shields are all 
negative as expected.  Those on TAXR are mostly positive, a reasonable finding (but contrary to 
the results of Booth et al, 2001) that may be attributable to our use of instruments to allow for 
the endogeneity of this variable.  The King conditions are generally consistently signed across 
leverage measures
23.  The debt-equity margin has the expected positive effect, but the generally 
negative sign on the debt-retentions margin is more surprising at first sight.  The mostly positive 
equity-retentions  margin  suggests  that  debt  and  equity  may  be  complements  from  the  tax 
perspective.  The signs on these conditions depend on the underlying financial policy of the 
company and the extent to which any tax can be precisely associated with a specific source of 
financing.  The sign on the debt-retentions margin may be associated with the non-marketability 
of  unquoted  company  shares.    If  ownership  is  stable  and  includes  a  significant  managerial 
component, then dividends are likely to be low, and the opportunity cost of retentions may be 
more closely related to loss of managerial perquisites than to capital gains tax liabilities.  If so, 
the sign on the debt-retentions margin is consistent with the generally low dividend payout rates 
by unquoted Indian companies (Green, Murinde and Suppakitjarak, 2003).  Overall therefore, 
the coefficients on the King conditions are quite plausible. 
In  summary,  the  estimates  of  the  model  are  well-determined  in  almost  every  particular, 
especially considering that this is a very heterogeneous group of companies, among which the 
accounting standards used in practise are likely to be quite variable in detail and in quality.  This 
gives confidence in using the model to simulate the effects of tax changes.  
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6.2 Simulating the effects of tax reforms 
The final step in the analysis is to evaluate the impact of the 1990s tax reforms.  We do this by 
calculating the impact of changes in the King conditions on the aggregate debt of our sample 
companies.  We concentrate on the King conditions because the statutory tax rates underlying 
them  can  be  regarded  as  nearly  true  policy  variables.    Of  course,  the  impact  of  the  King 
conditions depends on the general model of leverage and on the other tax variables in the model.  
However, we ignore any indirect effects which arise through the impact of changes in the King 
conditions on other variables in the model.  A detailed model of such effects would require 
another paper.  Moreover, the use of GMM to instrument the endogenous components of the tax 
variables  means  that  we  can  be  reasonably  confident  that  the  coefficient  estimates  do 
consistently isolate the effects of the King conditions per se.  It would be interesting to look at 
the effects of all the non-policy tax variables, but this too we defer to another paper. 
We begin by considering any particular tax change, say in year τ.  We construct adjusted series 
for all three King conditions which follow their historical paths through time (τ - 1), remain 
unchanged at time τ, and then replicate all subsequent changes in tax rates and hence in King 
conditions.  These three series undo the effect of the tax change which occurred at time τ.  Five 
sets of adjusted series are constructed to correspond to all the tax changes in the 1990s (table 5).  
Next, we use the estimated model to calculate hypothetical leverage values for all individual 
firms in the panel for all  years using the adjusted data.  For any particular tax change and 
leverage definition, these give a hypothetical leverage rate for each firm year-by-year in the 
absence of that tax change.  For each firm, there are 10 observations for each of the 5 tax 
changes and for each of the 7 leverage measures.  We then calculate each firm’s outstanding 
debt by multiplication by the denominator of the leverage rate.  For example, the n’th firm’s 
leverage at time t, using GDA1, is: GDA1t,n = TLt,n/TAt,n (total liabilities/total assets).  Simulated 
values of GDA1t,n without the tax change in year τ are given by: GDA1t,n(τ) (t = τ+1,...,1999).  
Debt outstanding is: TLt,n(τ) = GDA1t,n(τ)×TAt,n.  Finally, we sum the actual and hypothetical 
debt levels across firms on a year-by-year and a tax-change-by-tax-change basis.  The difference 
between actual aggregate debt outstanding and its hypothetical level without each tax change  
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gives the estimated impact of the tax change on a year-by-year basis.  For each year, we then 
sum across tax changes to get the total effect on debt outstanding of all tax changes from 1991. 
The preponderant effect of the 1990’s tax reforms was to reduce substantially the amount of 
outstanding unquoted company debt, especially from 1995 (table 8).  As tax rates were reduced 
considerably over the 1990s, this result is not surprising, but it provides further reassurance of 
the plausibility of the model and the estimates.  The only budget covered by this study at which 
tax  rates  were  raised  was  that  of  1991,  and  the  effect  of  this  was  a  moderate  increase  in 
outstanding debt.  Different leverage measures give remarkably similar results for the impact of 
the 1990s’ tax reforms, but the quantitative effects vary considerably, suggesting that further 
research on different leverage measures is required. 
_____________________________________________________________________________  
Tables 8 and 9 about here 
_____________________________________________________________________________  
Budget-by-budget measures of tax impact are shown in table 9.  Each row gives the effect on 
total  debt  outstanding  which  can  be  attributed  year-by-year  to  any  particular  budget.    The 
relationship between total debt and tax rates is non-linear because the dependent variable in the 
model is leverage rather than debt outstanding.  Evidently, there were substantial variations in 
the impact of individual budgets.  The 1994 budget included reductions in the rates of corporate 
profits tax and capital gains tax that reduced the tax advantage of debt.  These measures reduced 
corporate debt in our sample by between Rs3.28bn and Rs9.92bn, by 1999, although the first-
year effect was much smaller.  Also of interest is the 1997 budget which introduced the flat 10% 
tax  on  dividends  designed  to  encourage  firms  to  retain  earnings.    As  we  noted  above,  this 
involved a substantially larger change in the debt-equity margin than the debt-retentions margin.  
Consequently, debt decreased following the budget, implying an increase in the combined share 
of equity and retentions, but it is not possible to assert whether equity financing or retentions 
increased  as  a  consequence.    However,  these  examples  underline  the  point  that  the  tax 
coefficients have to be looked at jointly rather than separately because of the simplification that 
each King condition gives a binary choice, treating other sources of finance as given.  
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The impact effects of the tax changes are broadly consistent with Graham’s (2004) conclusion 
that tax has significant but small effects on company financing, although in many instances, the 
impact effect did account for a substantial proportion of the change in debt in that year.  In 
contrast, the total effects (over several years) are much larger.  The most conservative estimate 
implies that the overall ceteris paribus impact of the tax reforms was to reduce outstanding debt 
by 17% for our sample unquoted companies as a whole; other leverage measures give higher 
estimates.  These figures are appreciably higher than those reported by Green and Murinde 
(2003) for Indian quoted companies during the same period, but are not out of line with the 
estimates for smaller (mostly unquoted) US companies reported by Gordon and Lee (2001).  
This in turn suggests that unquoted companies may respond more to tax changes than quoted 
companies.  Which is more relevant: the impact effect or the total effect?  This depends in part 
on our view of corporate financing decisions.  On a trade-off view, any given change in desired 
leverage will cast a long shadow on company debt, because debt outstanding will change as the 
size of the company changes.  A trade-off interpretation would therefore suggest that the total 
effect is of more interest.  The pecking-order approach on the other hand would suggest that 
each  year’s  financing  depends  primarily  on  the  current  values  of  the  firm’s  objectives  and 
constraints,  and  this  would  suggest  that  the  impact  effect  is  of  more  interest.    These  two 
interpretations  give  rise  to  important  quantitative  differences  in  conclusions,  and  therefore 
suggest  that  there  is  need  for  further  consideration  of  the  magnitude  of  the  debt-taxes 
relationship. 
7.  Summary of conclusions 
In this paper we have studied the impact of tax policy on the financial decisions of a sample of 
unquoted Indian companies within the context of an ad hoc but plausible model of leverage.  
There are numerous important details, but the key conclusions are these.  First, we find that a 
conventional model does a good job of explaining the leverage ratios of unquoted Indian non-
financial companies.  Considering the variations in accounting practise that are common among 
unquoted  companies,  this  in  itself  is  a  substantial  result.    Second,  we  find  that  it  is  very 
important to use appropriate estimation methods.  GMM substantially improves the efficiency of  
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the  estimates,  in  comparison  with  more  standard  panel  techniques.    Third,  tax  policy  as 
measured  has  an  important  and  generally  plausible  impact  on  leverage  decisions:  King’s 
conditions all have significant and plausible coefficients.  Fourth, effective tax rates and non-
debt tax shields have a significant and plausible impact on financing decisions.  Evaluating their 
precise quantitative impact is an important subject for further research.  Fifth, we can trace the 
broad effects of the 1990s tax reforms, and we find that these reforms had a substantial impact 
in reducing outstanding unquoted company debt.  In general, these results suggest the need for 
care in tax policy-making aimed at specific financial objectives in the company sector.  The 
impact may be difficult to isolate as it will depend on the relationships among all the relevant 
tax variables that influence company financial decisions.  Finally, we believe that these results 
suggest that there is need for further research on the magnitude of the impact of tax policy on 
debt, particularly in developing economies where little is known about this issue.  
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Table 1:  Theory of leverage: explanatory variables and hypothesized signs of coefficients 
 
Explanatory variables  Mnemonic  Expected 
sign 
References 
Capital structure theory       
Asset Tangibility  TANG  +  Rajan and Zingales, 1995 
Asset Intangibility  INTAN  -  Titman and Wessels, 1988 
Size  SIZE  + 
(-) 




GROW  - 
(+) 
Hall, Hutchinson, and Michaelas, 2000 (-) 
Jordan, Lowe, and Taylor, 1998 (+) 
Profitability  PROF  - 
(+) 
Thies and Klock, 1992, (-) 
Jensen, Solberg, and Zorn, 1992 (+) 
Business risk  RISK  -  Friend and Hasbrouck, 1988 
Age of the firm  AGE  +  Wiwattanakantang, 1999 
Industrial class  IND  ±  Titman and Wessels, 1988 
India       
Business group member  BG(i)  ±  Manos, Murinde, and Green, 2001 
Tax variables       
King's tax conditions  TXDVR, TXDVE, 
TXEVR 
±  Chowdhury and Miles, 1989 
Effective Tax rate  TAXR  - 
+ 
Booth, Aivazian, Demirguc-Kunt, and 
Maksimovic, 2001 
Non-debt tax shields  NDTS  -  Hirota, 1999 
 
 
Table 2: Characteristics of Sample Unquoted Companies 
 
Code  Industrial Classification  no.  Ownership Groups  no. 
22  Mining  1  Top 50 business houses  43 
24  Non-financial services  16  Large business houses  8 
31  Food & Beverages  13  Other business houses  9 
32  Textiles  14  Other Indian private  37 
33  Chemicals  16     
34  Non-Metallic Mineral Products  3     
35  Metals & Metal Products  5     
36  Machinery  14     
37  Transport Equipment  7     
38  Miscellaneous Manufacturing  2     
39  Diversified  6     
  Total no. of companies  97  Total no. of companies  97 
 
Size in 1994 (Rs10millon; Rs31.37=$1) 
  Minimum  Quartile 1  Median  Quartile 3  Maximum 
Net sales  3.36  20.32  38.72  77.92  1639.62 
Net assets  0.56  7.74  21.88  46.34  1556.61 
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Table 3:  Measures of leverage 
 
Abbr  Definition 
  Total liabilities or debt/total assets 
GDA1  total liabilities/total assets 
GDA2  (debt+trade credit)/total assets 
GDA3  debt/total assets 
  debt/(debt+equity+retentions) 
GDER2  (debt+trade credit)/ 
  (debt+trade credit+equity+share premia+preference+reserves & surplus) 
GDER3  debt/(debt+equity+share premia+preference+reserves & surplus) 
  debt/(debt+equity) 
GDE2  (debt+trade credit)/(debt+trade credit+equity+share premia+preference) 
GDE3  debt/(debt+equity+share premia+preference) 
 
Table 4:  Definitions of explanatory variables 
 
X  Concept  Abbr  Sign  Definition (book values) 
  Capital structure theory       
1  Asset tangibility  TANG  +  Fixed assets/total assets 
2  Asset intangibility  INTAN  -  intangibles/total assets 
3  Size  SIZE  +/(-) Ln(real net sales) 
[= (sales - indirect taxes)/consumer price index] 
4  Growth opportunities  GROW  -/(+) = (EBITDA/book equity (t-1))*(retained earnings 
/EAT) 
= 0 if EAT = 0 
5  Profitability  PROF  -/(+) EBITDA/assets (t-1) 
  Business risk  RISK  -  Normalized absolute residuals from regression of real 
value added on time:   0 1 0 ˆ / ) ˆ ˆ / ( a T a a P VA − −  
VA = sales - indirect taxes - wage costs; 









 = RISK if a1 > 0; = 0 otherwise (positive time trend) 
 = RISK if a1 < 0; = 0 otherwise (negative time trend) 
8  Age of the firm  AGE  +  number of years since incorporation 
9  Industrial class  IND(i)  ±  dummy variable for industry group 
  India       
10  Business group  BG(i)  ±  dummy variable for group type 
  Tax, non-debt tax shields       
12  King:  debt-equity  TXDVE  +?  (1 – i)(1 - s)/((1 - t)(1 - m)) - 1 
13  King:  debt-retentions  TXDVR  +?  (1 – i)/((1 - t)(1 - z)) - 1 
14  King:  equity-retentions  TXEVR  ±  (1 - m)/((1 - s)(1 - z) - 1 
15  Effective tax rate  TAXR  -/+  corporate tax/EBT    (= 0 if EBT = 0) 
16  Total NDTS - export profits  NDTS  -  (EBTDA - taxes/corporate tax rate)/total assets 
Notes: 
Unless otherwise shown, all variables are measured contemporaneously with leverage.   
EBITDA: Earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization 
EBTDA: Earnings before tax, depreciation and amortization 
EBT Earnings before tax 
EAT:Earnings after tax 
Flows are annualized by: *12/no of months in accounting year  
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Table 5.  King's Tax Conditions 
 
Years to  top rates 
 end-March  D-E  D-R  E-R 
1989  1.1739  1.1739  0 
1990  1.1739  1.1739  0 
1991  0.8519  0.8519  0 
1992  1.0725  1.0725  0 
1993  1.0725  1.0725  0 
1994  1.0725  1.0725  0 
1995  0.8519  0.5873  -0.1429 
1996  0.8519  0.5873  -0.1429 
1997  0.7544  0.3158  -0.25 
1998  0.1966  0.3462  0.125 
1999  0.1966  0.3462  0.125 
Notes: 
D-E: Debt-equity margin given retentions   (1 - i)/((1 - t)(1 - m)) – 1; 
D-R: Debt-retentions margin given equity   (1 - i)/((1 - t)(1 - z)) – 1; 
E-R: Equity-retentions margin given debt   (1 - m)/(1 - z) – 1. 
z = capital gains tax rate, t = corporate profits tax rate, m = marginal tax rate on dividends, 
i = marginal tax rate on debt interest 
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Table 6.  Panel Diagnostics 
 
Test  GDA1  GDA2  GDA3  GDER2  GDER3  GDE2  GDE3  critical 
values: 
0.99  0.975  0.95 
Hetero  19.49**  13.92**  6.802**  71.93**  79.92**  22.05**  34.79**  χ
2(1)  6.635  5.024  3.841 
Firm effects  1277**  1590**  1695**  1611**  1229**  1523**  1438**  χ
2(1)  6.635  5.024  3.841 
Time effects  0.4464  1.510  3.883*  0.7501  1.538  0.7381  1.886  χ
2(1)  6.635  5.024  3.841 
Hausman  23.83  17.85  6.468  46.94**  50.14**  22.62  13.25  χ
2(15)  30.58  27.49  25.00 
Pooling1  0.5523  0.5451  0.5462  0.4568  0.5117  0.5416  0.5832  F(261,680)  1.264  1.218  1.180 
Pooling2  0.3688  0.3657  0.3756  0.3063  0.3462  0.3616  0.3962  F(333,600)  1.248  1.206  1.170 
Notes 




nt h h nt V X y ε γ β + + = ∑ ∑ , , ; where H = number of company- and time-specific variables; G = 
number of time-invariant variables; N = number of companies; T = number of years. 
Hetero:  LM test for heteroskedasticity based on OLS estimates of (2), using as regressor squared fitted values of the explanatory variable; 
distributed as χ
2(1) under the null of no heteroskedasticity (Breusch and Pagan, 1980) 
Firm:  LM test for firm effects based on OLS estimates of (2) distributed as χ
2(1) under the null of no firm effects (Breusch and Pagan, 1980) 
Time:  LM test for time effects based on OLS estimates of (2) distributed as χ
2(1) under the null of no time effects (Breusch and Pagan, 1980) 
Hausman:  Hausman test for correlation between the firm effects and the explanatory variables, based on (2) excluding the time-invariant variables 
(V), distributed as  χ
2(H) under the null of no correlation  (Hausman, 1978). 
Pooling1:  Test for poolability over time based on (2), distributed as  F(D1,D2); D1 = (T-1)(H+G); D2 = NT-(H+G)T under the null of poolability 
Pooling2:  Test for poolability over time based on (2) augmented by (8) time dummies, distributed as  F(D1,D2); D1 = (T-1)(H+G)-8; D2 = NT-
(H+G)T under the null of poolability 
*  Significant at 95% level;  ** Significant at 99% level.  
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Table 7(i). Parameter Estimates: Company- and Time-specific Variables and Tax Conditions 
 
  OWIV  GMM Estimates 
  GDA1  GDA1  GDA2  GDA3  GDE2  GDE3  GDER2  GDER3 
TANG  -0.1459  -0.3020  -0.2440  0.0957  0.0329  0.1121  -0.2834  -0.1110 
(t)  (0.84)  (7.04)  (4.48)  (3.03)  (1.77)  (2.46)  (7.10)  (2.44) 
INTAN  2.9800  -0.0158  -0.5363  0.6913  0.1908  1.0405  -0.3565  0.3597 
(t)  (1.12)  (0.07)  (1.72)  (3.32)  (0.80)  (2.40)  (1.40)  (1.53) 
SIZE  0.0241  0.0639  0.0576  0.0137  0.0444  0.0415  0.0611  0.0546 
(t)  (0.86)  (7.15)  (8.96)  (2.32)  (8.39)  (7.50)  (7.19)  (7.84) 
NDTS  0.9615  -0.3795  -0.2583  -0.4203  -0.1993  -0.1838  -0.2442  -0.1492 
(t)  (0.27)  (2.48)  (2.51)  (3.00)  (2.25)  (0.90)  (2.09)  (0.94) 
GROW  0.0062  0.0086  0.0099  0.0144  0.0080  0.0179  0.0086  0.0166 
(t)  (0.20)  (2.68)  (4.39)  (3.73)  (4.86)  (5.77)  (3.15)  (6.00) 
PROF  -0.2394  -0.1948  -0.2573  -0.1200  -0.0467  -0.1431  -0.2712  -0.3211 
(t)  (2.08)  (8.18)  (14.14)  (6.50)  (2.63)  (4.37)  (12.21)  (18.41) 
RISKP  -0.0098  -0.0022  -0.0027  -0.0059  -0.0017  -0.0105  -0.0023  -0.0069 
(t)  (1.63)  (5.53)  (7.59)  (18.90)  (4.46)  (11.13)  (5.15)  (20.14) 
TAXR  -0.2249  0.0230  -0.0048  0.0007  0.0206  0.0463  0.0084  0.0112 
(t)  (0.55)  (2.08)  (0.53)  (0.07)  (2.12)  (2.92)  (0.92)  (0.95) 
AGE  -0.0098  0.0000  0.0011  0.0012  0.0032  0.0025  0.0006  -0.0007 
(t)  (3.00)  (0.01)  (1.32)  (1.89)  (4.69)  (2.31)  (0.74)  (0.74) 
TXDVE  -0.0271  0.3666  0.2171  -0.0402  0.2081  -0.0463  0.3285  0.1144 
(t)  (0.12)  (7.99)  (6.39)  (0.87)  (6.07)  (0.78)  (8.22)  (2.07) 
TXDVR  0.0468  -0.2906  -0.1573  0.0567  -0.1444  0.1118  -0.2459  -0.0703 
(t)  (0.22)  (7.43)  (4.71)  (1.32)  (4.90)  (2.18)  (6.56)  (1.40) 
TXEVR  -0.1260  0.6721  0.3605  -0.0968  0.3896  -0.1591  0.5747  0.1718 
(t)  (0.28)  (7.49)  (5.23)  (1.10)  (5.87)  (1.37)  (7.21)  (1.65) 
Notes 
See table 7(ii).  
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Table 7(ii). Parameter Estimates: Business Groups, Industry, and Diagnostics 
 
  GMM Estimates 
  GDA1  GDA2  GDA3  GDE2  GDE3  GDER2  GDER3 
BG: Top 50  0.4349  0.2682  0.1286  0.4989  0.4580  0.3176  0.2267 
(t)  (2.56)  (1.93)  (1.57)  (2.67)  (2.65)  (2.25)  (1.69) 
BG: "Large"  0.2030  0.2283  0.0955  0.1903  0.0611  0.2745  0.1994 
(t)  (1.10)  (2.08)  (1.54)  (1.58)  (0.41)  (2.51)  (1.79) 
BG: "Other"  -0.1026  -0.1353  0.0372  0.5646  0.0348  0.0903  -0.1745 
(t)  (0.37)  (0.97)  (0.34)  (2.12)  (0.16)  (0.58)  (0.85) 
IND: 31  0.6597  0.3114  0.2338  0.4510  0.4065  0.3972  0.3244 
(t)  (3.85)  (2.20)  (2.38)  (2.86)  (2.27)  (2.78)  (2.07) 
IND: 32  0.4189  0.5051  0.2603  0.0259  0.2791  0.3459  0.5373 
(t)  (1.73)  (3.66)  (3.32)  (0.13)  (1.48)  (2.29)  (3.36) 
IND: 33  -0.0744  0.0627  -0.0329  0.0653  -0.0930  0.0568  0.0267 
(t)  (0.42)  (0.47)  (0.46)  (0.35)  (0.56)  (0.41)  (0.21) 
IND: 35  0.4521  0.1977  0.1359  0.8940  0.7351  0.3580  0.1826 
(t)  (1.41)  (0.82)  (0.79)  (2.69)  (2.50)  (1.47)  (0.55) 
IND: 36  0.0155  0.0793  0.0537  0.0163  0.0145  0.0935  0.0945 
(t)  (0.11)  (0.70)  (0.80)  (0.10)  (0.10)  (0.79)  (0.90) 
IND: 37  0.3211  0.2361  0.2890  0.1976  0.2624  0.2816  0.1395 
(t)  (0.68)  (0.78)  (1.47)  (0.52)  (0.70)  (0.86)  (0.42) 
IND: 39  0.5295  0.5076  0.0100  0.1027  0.5541  0.4793  0.6070 
(t)  (1.51)  (2.45)  (0.07)  (0.46)  (1.79)  (2.04)  (2.13) 
               
Sargan: χ χ χ χ
2(73)  82.6867  83.8650  80.7993  84.7507  78.3075  88.0106  82.4814 
prob  (0.205)  (0.181)  (0.249)  (0.164)  (0.314)  (0.111)  (0.210) 
               
Wald1: χ χ χ χ
2(2)  64.22  108.32  11.37  69.26  49.35  157.60  20.81 
prob  (1.00)  (1.00)  (1.00)  (1.00)  (1.00)  (1.00)  (1.00) 
Wald2: χ χ χ χ
2(3)  16.63  31.82  10.42  14.01  10.26  24.02  21.10 
Prob  (1.00)  (1.00)  (0.98)  (1.00)  (0.98)  (1.00)  (1.00) 
Wald3: χ χ χ χ
2(7)  53.97  31.82  37.87  42.09  46.46  34.60  41.61 
prob  (1.00)  (1.00)  (1.00)  (1.00)  (1.00)  (1.00)  (1.00) 
N*T  970  970  970  970  970  970  970 
Notes 
(t)     are White-corrected t statistics (White, 1980). 
Sargan:  is  Sargan’s  J  test  distributed  as  χ
2(k),  where  k  is  the  number  of  overidentifying  moment 
restrictions  (Sargan, 1958).  Prob gives the probability of rejection. 
Wald:  is a Wald test distributed as χ
2(k); k = number of restrictions.  Wald1 tests against the null of 
equality among the parameters for TXDVR, TXDVE, and TXEVR.  Wald2 tests against the null 
of equality among the parameters for the 10 industry dummies.  Wald3 tests against the null of 
equality among the parameters for the 3 business group dummies.  Prob gives the probability of 
rejection.  
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Table 8.  Total Impact of Tax Changes on Outstanding Debt 
(Actual - Simulated: Rs10m) 
Leverage measure   1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999 
GDA1                     
debt outstanding  Rs10m  3767  4627  4932  5318  6320  7187  8282  10076  10794 
change    400  861  304  387  1001  867  1095  1794  718 
Tax: total effect    -164  75  82  90  -146  -174  -1711  -3172  -3494 
Proportion    -0.0437 0.0163 0.0166 0.0168 -0.0232 -0.0242 -0.2066 -0.3148 -0.3237 
GDA2                     
debt outstanding  Rs10m  2982  3693  3822  4034  4772  5324  6881  8415  9002 
change    301  711  129  212  738  552  1557  1535  586 
Tax: total effect    -129  59  64  70  -188  -219  -1168  -3087  -3402 
Proportion    -0.0434 0.0160 0.0169 0.0174 -0.0394 -0.0411 -0.1698 -0.3669 -0.3779 
GDA3                     
debt outstanding  Rs10m  1817  2227  2331  2471  2877  3299  4594  5867  6386 
change    138  410  104  140  406  422  1295  1274  519 
Tax: total effect    -36  16  18  18  -300  -343  -508  -1079  -1189 
Proportion    -0.0197 0.0074 0.0077 0.0074 -0.1041 -0.1039 -0.1107 -0.1838 -0.1862 
GDE2                     
debt outstanding  Rs10m  2982  3693  3822  4034  4772  5324  6881  8415  9002 
change    301  711  129  212  738  552  1557  1535  586 
Tax: total effect    -90  40  41  42  -249  -278  -1063  -1441  -1529 
Proportion    -0.0302 0.0107 0.0107 0.0104 -0.0522 -0.0522 -0.1545 -0.1713 -0.1698 
GDE3                     
debt outstanding  Rs10m  1817  2227  2331  2471  2877  3299  4594  5867  6386 
change    138  410  104  140  406  422  1295  1274  519 
Tax: total effect    -68  29  30  30  -374  -416  -797  -1703  -1827 
Proportion    -0.0376 0.0131 0.0130 0.0123 -0.1299 -0.1261 -0.1735 -0.2903 -0.2861 
GDER2                     
debt outstanding  Rs10m  2982  3693  3822  4034  4772  5324  6881  8415  9002 
change    301  711  129  212  738  552  1557  1535  586 
Tax: total effect    -158  73  78  84  -231  -268  -1629  -3550  -3919 
Proportion    -0.0530 0.0197 0.0205 0.0209 -0.0484 -0.0503 -0.2368 -0.4218 -0.4353 
GDER3                     
debt outstanding  Rs10m  1817  2227  2331  2471  2877  3299  4594  5867  6386 
change    138  410  104  140  406  422  1295  1274  519 
Tax: total effect    -68  31  34  37  -168  -195  -688  -1909  -2133 
Proportion    -0.0375 0.0139 0.0145 0.0148 -0.0586 -0.0592 -0.1498 -0.3253 -0.3340 
Notes 
Debt outstanding:  is the actual total debt outstanding for all sample companies 
Change:      is the year-to-year change in debt outstanding 
Tax: total effect:  is the cumulative impact up to the current year of tax changes made in all budgets 
from 1990 through the preceding year. 
Proportion:     is the ratio of the total tax effect to debt outstanding  
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Table 9.  Year-by-Year Impact of Tax Changes on Outstanding Debt 
(Actual - Simulated: Rs10m) 
Leverage  
measure 
year of tax  
change 
1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999 
GDA1  1990  -164  -62  -68  -75  -176  -204  -610  -959  -1057 
  1991    137  150  165  115  129  -231  -501  -551 
  1994          -85  -99  -492  -816  -899 
  1996              -377  -676  -745 
  1997                -220  -242 
  Total  -164  75  82  90  -146  -174  -1711  -3172  -3494 
GDA2  1990  -129  -49  -53  -59  -163  -188  -444  -871  -961 
  1991    108  118  129  66  74  -146  -512  -563 
  1994          -91  -105  -350  -758  -836 
  1996              -229  -612  -674 
  1997                -334  -368 
  Total  -129  59  64  70  -188  -219  -1168  -3087  -3402 
GDA3  1990  -36  -13  -15  -17  -128  -146  -196  -330  -364 
  1991    30  33  35  -64  -74  -114  -231  -254 
  1994          -107  -123  -169  -297  -328 
  1996              -29  -128  -141 
  1997                -93  -102 
  Total  -36  16  18  18  -300  -343  -508  -1079  -1189 
GDE2  1990  -90  -32  -34  -36  -143  -159  -374  -479  -508 
  1991    72  74  78  -6  -8  -192  -264  -280 
  1994          -100  -111  -316  -410  -436 
  1996              -180  -250  -265 
  1997                -38  -40 
  Total  -90  40  41  42  -249  -278  -1063  -1441  -1529 
GDE3  1990  -68  -24  -25  -28  -169  -189  -305  -515  -553 
  1991    53  55  58  -68  -75  -164  -346  -372 
  1994          -137  -152  -259  -460  -494 
  1996              -69  -232  -249 
  1997                -149  -160 
  Total  -68  29  30  30  -374  -416  -797  -1703  -1827 
GDER2  1990  -158  -60  -64  -71  -198  -226  -599  -1041  -1149 
  1991    132  143  156  78  86  -224  -587  -647 
  1994          -111  -128  -481  -898  -992 
  1996              -326  -710  -784 
  1997                -314  -347 
  Total  -158  73  78  84  -231  -268  -1629  -3550  -3919 
GDER3  1990  -68  -26  -28  -31  -109  -126  -266  -540  -603 
  1991    56  62  68  12  13  -97  -333  -371 
  1994          -71  -82  -213  -474  -530 
  1996              -112  -350  -392 
  1997                -212  -237 
  Total  -68  31  34  37  -168  -195  -688  -1909  -2133 
  Notes 
Each entry gives the impact on total debt outstanding that can be attributed in any year to each budget. 
The total is the sum of individual budget effects and is the same as the “Tax: total effect” in table 8.  
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Appendix:  Instrument Set for GMM Estimation 































                                    …A1 
Each zt (t = 1,...,10) is the instrument set for the corresponding cross-section equation.  We use 
the assumption that the correlation between the exogenous variables (X1) and the company effect 
(µ) is constant over time.  Using the notation Zi,t-j to refer to vectors of instruments, and Q to refer 
to the within-group operator, the zt can be written as follows: 
[ ] t t t t Z Z Z z , 3 1 , 2 , 1 , , − = ;            t = 1                           
[ ] 1 , 2 , 1 , − = t t t Z Z z ;              t = 2,...,9                         
[ ] t t t t t Z QZ QZ QZ z , 4 2 , 1 1 , 1 , 1 , , , − − = ;     t = 10                           
where:   Z1 = SIZE, GROW, PROF, RISKP    (“exogenous”) 
      Z2 = TANG, INTAN, NDTS, TAXR    (“predetermined”) 
      Z3= TXDVR      (tax rate) 
      Z4= AGE        (time-invariant) 
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Appendix Table A1.  Correlation matrix of Company- and Time-Specific Variables 
 
  GDA1  GDA2  GDA3  GDE2  GDE3  GDER2  GDER3  TANG  INTAN  SIZE  NDTS  GROW  PROF  RISKP  RISKNA  TAXR 
GDA1  1.0000                               
GDA2  0.8523  1.0000                             
GDA3  0.5394  0.6973  1.0000                           
GDE2  0.6799  0.6327  0.4316  1.0000                         
GDE3  0.5754  0.6128  0.6686  0.8297  1.0000                       
GDER2  0.9636  0.9469  0.6312  0.6898  0.6236  1.0000                     
GDER3  0.7923  0.8525  0.8848  0.5537  0.7388  0.8535  1.0000                   
TANG  -0.3144  -0.1479  0.1673  -0.1299  0.0354  -0.2445  -0.0343  1.0000                 
INTAN  -0.0116  0.0358  -0.0245  -0.0550  -0.0311  0.0083  0.0131  -0.0217  1.0000               
SIZE  -0.0418  -0.0439  0.0855  -0.0343  0.0822  -0.0306  0.0279  0.0451  -0.0457  1.0000             
NDTS  -0.0836  -0.0685  0.0855  0.0074  0.0528  -0.0767  0.0010  0.1297  -0.0285  0.1757  1.0000           
GROW  0.1300  0.1144  0.1021  0.1314  0.1186  0.1270  0.1188  -0.0514  -0.0411  0.1026  0.1584  1.0000         
PROF  -0.2169  -0.1792  -0.0240  -0.1076  -0.0923  -0.2177  -0.1460  0.0405  0.0381  0.1759  0.2974  0.5696  1.0000       
RISKP  -0.0255  -0.0828  -0.1219  -0.0055  -0.0892  -0.0552  -0.1180  -0.0584  0.0125  0.0232  -0.0079  0.0590  0.1359  1.0000     
RISKN  -0.0148  -0.0353  -0.0589  -0.0279  -0.0241  -0.0165  -0.0233  -0.0474  -0.0742  -0.1881  -0.1326  -0.0728  -0.2037  -0.1035  1.0000   
TAXR  -0.0261  -0.1256  -0.2100  0.0325  -0.0487  -0.0777  -0.1678  -0.2893  -0.0809  -0.0359  0.2529  0.0295  0.1892  0.0532  -0.0897  1.0000 
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Footnotes 
                                                 
1  Quoted firms may not necessarily adhere to exchange disclosure requirements.  This has been an issue for the Bombay Stock Exchange 
(BSE), but non-compliance can lead to suspension of the shares by the BSE.  We are indebted to an anonymous referee for this point. 
2  In a related paper we investigate the impact of tax policy on a sample of quoted companies: Green and Murinde (2003). 
3  For a general overview of India in the 1990s, see the collection of essays in Ahluwalia and Little (1998), especially Singh (1998). 
4  King was analysing the then-current UK corporate tax system.  Thus, he did not distinguish between the tax rates on dividend and 
interest income.  However, King’s original conditions are easily amended to arrive at the formulas given in the text. 
5  Booth, Aivazian, Demirguc-Kunt, Maksimovic used the effective tax rates in a set of individual country regressions.  However, in a 
separate cross-country regression they used instead King’s debt-equity condition. 
6  Allowing for loss carryovers, a simple dichotomous (Plesko) or trichotomous (Graham) variable is a good approximation to the ‘true’ 
simulated marginal rate in the US. 
7  Firms which reported negative net worth were technically bankrupt under Indian law.  Such firms, once registered, with the statutory 
Board for Financial and Industrial Reconstruction as “sick”, effectively cease operations until a reorganisation plan is proposed and 
agreed by the Board.  For further details see Goswami (1996) and (2000).  We are indebted to an anonymous referee for this point. 
8  Data corresponding to account years of between 7 and 11 months were adjusted to a 12 month basis.  However, the regressions were 
also run separately using  the  unadjusted data and there were no major differences in the results. 
9  For example, company size was calculated by deflating sales by the consumer price index.  Companies reporting at end-March were 
deflated by the March consumer price index, those reporting at end-June were deflated by the June price index and so on. 
10  These figures may somewhat exaggerate the importance of business groups for two reasons.  First, reporting standards within a group 
are likely to be superior to those within stand-alone companies.  Thus, our sample selection procedure may over-represent group 
companies.  Second, since most Indian companies do not produce consolidated accounts, some companies which, according to our data, 
belong to a business house may in fact be majority-owned subsidiaries. 
11  All our data are measured at book value as there are evidently no market value data available for unquoted companies. 
12  For example, provisions for tax and dividends are funds set aside from the current financial year, but they are paid in the following year. 
13  The more commonly-used market-to-book ratio is not applicable here as, by construction, we have no market values. 
14  Value added is preferred to profits because reported profits may contain idiosyncratic components which are unrelated to business 
activity during the accounting year.  Value added is a better reflection of underlying economic profit. 
15  The material in this section is derived particularly from: Income Tax Department (2001), Institute of Chartered Accountants of India 
(2000), Price Waterhouse (1996) and Taxmann's Companies Act (2000). 
16  The tax year runs from April to end-March.  A distinction is made between the assessment year and the financial year.  Income accrued 
in any given financial year is taxed at the rates applicable to that year.  However, the tax for that year is assessed and payment finalized 
in the following year, which is the assessment year.  Dates in the text refer to financial years ending in March. 
17  The top rate of tax became payable at annual incomes of Rs100,000 through 1992;  Rs120,000 through 1997; and Rs150,000 thereafter. 
18  Two further features of company taxation not modelled in this paper are as follows.  First, closely-held companies were subject to a 
higher rate of tax than more widely-held public companies until April 1994 when the rates were unified.  Second, since April 1996, 
companies have been subject to a Minimum Alternative Tax. This is levied if the taxable income of a company calculated according to 
the standard provisions of the tax act is less than 30% of its book profits. 
19  Long-term gains are those on assets held for more than 3 years (one year for listed securities or mutual fund units).  Gains on assets held 
for a shorter period and those on which depreciation is charged are short-term.  
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20  R&D is only available for a subsample of firms; export profits are not reported at all; and book depreciation may bear only a tenuous 
relationship to tax depreciation.  We initially used estimates of depreciation and export profits in the model, but their coefficients were 
mostly positive, suggesting mis-specification.  We therefore aggregated all non-debt tax shields as explained in the text. 
21  Ziliak studied a sample of 5320 observations. 
22  A full set of OWIV estimates is available from the authors on request. 
23  The exceptions, GDA3 and GDE3, are mostly not significant. 